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 The main purpose of this paper is to explore the current status of the 
European Union and Eurozone, focusing on economic and political aspects 
and in the context of decisions made quite recently. The contemporary crises 
have shown that especially the common monetary policy of the ECB and 
single interest rate are inadequate for all euro area members and caused 
deterioration in the economic situation of some peripheral countries. The 
paper elaborates on the main flaws of the EU and Eurozone, highlights and 
draws attention to a vacuum of European law in the case of the option to 
leave the Eurozone. The paper critically analyses decision-making carried 
out at European level by the political class where the reality of European 
specifics and the continent’s historic development was ignored.  
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Introduction 
 The European Union is experiencing one of the biggest challenges in 
its history following the summer of this year. The refugee crisis hit some 
member states to an unprecedented extent and revealed other faults in 
common European political decisions. The opportunity was missed to 
concentrate on the necessary structural reforms and enhance the functioning 
of the internal market; elites in Brussels will have to make a huge effort to 
deal with this overarching issue affecting the future composition of the 
European continent in the coming decades. This problem relegated other 
areas of tension within the European Union to the background. In particular, 
further development in some Eurozone countries, which are contending - for 
their economy - with a strong euro, lower competitiveness and economic 
growth. Attention directed towards important issues such as high public debt 
and unemployment rate in some countries; consolidating positions of protest 
parties and movements; the matter of Brexit; Greece; escalating use of 
unconventional policy by ECB; absence of fiscal transfers within the 
monetary union, and the ageing European population could well be 
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downgraded. This paper analyses some of the basic inadequacies of the 
European integration process which undermine the theory of its operation. It 
discusses fundamental issues that especially make the Eurozone situation so 
complicated and outlines why the European Union will struggle with both its 
organisational and institutional architecture as well as future development.  
  
Ignorance of theoretical prerequisites in the economic field and 
unconventional policy 
 European integration has been evolving through various 
developmental stages since its inception. The first of these stages included 
notions of federalism and functionalism; the sixties and seventies argued on 
behalf of the concept of an intergovernmental approach. The next two 
decades were influenced and characterized by many aspects such as multi-
level governance, social constructivism, new institutionalism and a liberal 
intergovernmental approach (Rosamond 2000; Schneider&Aspinwall 2001). 
 The new form of the European Union arising in the nineties was 
based on two important pillars: Monetary Union and the Schengen system. 
Both possess an unflattering status these days. The idea of monetary union 
among European countries has existed for decades. Some theoretical and 
practical benefits of single currency and free movement are indisputable. 
However, the EU’s founding fathers and European officials completely 
omitted certain vital aspects; they made unrealistic and wrong assumptions, 
respectively. They didn´t take into consideration different functioning and 
specific processes occurring between northern countries and the less 
competitive southern periphery bound by common monetary policy with the 
single interest rate set for all by the European Central Bank. It´s a matter of 
fact that the single interest rate does not suit all euro area members.  
 The Taylor rule (despite some of its limitations) applied to core and 
periphery countries between 1999 and 2013 confirmed the inappropriateness 
of the “one size fits all” concept. Moreover, calculations for the pre-crises 
period have demonstrated that some of the peripheral countries should have 
had their interest rates around twice as high as the core countries (Ševčíková, 
2015, p. 133).   
 The Creators of European Economic and Monetary Union also 
proceeded from the wrong assumption of the theory of endogeneity 
(described in Frankel & Rose, 1998) that common currency will be the main 
engine for the mutual convergence of the union’s economies. It basically 
means that the convergence among its members will occur ex-post.  
 The statistical testing of real economic convergence based on the 
method of ß-convergence between the core and peripheral countries over the 
whole period 2003-2012 confirmed much less than convergence but on the 
contrary their divergence (Ševčíková, 2015). In practice, this entails that 
European Scientific Journal December 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.2   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
141 
economies with higher incomes (core countries) grew faster than most of 
those who are characterized by lower gross domestic product per capita 
(peripheral countries). On the other hand, the theory of convergence is 
applicable to old and new member states and to periphery countries and new 
member states in 2003 - 2012 and the pre-crises period (Ševčíková, 2015). 
Since 2008, the catching-up effect has almost stopped. Some euro area 
countries, especially Greece, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and others experienced a 
significant fall in their standard of living measured in GDP per capita in PPS.  
Currently, with the exception of three countries, all EU states have become 
more indebted since 2004.  
 Being verified from many aspects and by various authors (Kadarmo 
2008; Eichengreen 1991; Artis 2003), it remains true that the current 
members of the euro zone cannot be considered an optimum currency area 
(OCA). The neglect of essential theoretical prerequisites of OCA by EU 
authorities (notably heterogeneity of economies, weak mobility of 
production factors, low flexibility of prices and wages, absence of extensive 
fiscal transfers towards the weaker members) emphasise the less than 
successful operating of euro in some countries. Moreover, as M. Feldstein 
(1997, p. 41) states: “Uniform monetary policy and inflexible exchange rates 
will create conflicts whenever cyclical conditions differ among the member 
countries”. This does not mean that common currency would not work well 
in select current euro area countries.  
 Recent development in European and global economy has shown that 
theoretical postulates valid for decades do not apply to the current global 
setting.  However, the conditions of the theory of OCA are still relevant as 
can be seen in the example of euro area. It would not be correct to argue that 
common currency is the only cause of the poor state of some Eurozone 
members. First of all, the main culprits are the member states themselves 
along with the erroneous politico-economic activities of their governing 
classes. That being said, legitimate criticism must be directed to all who 
essentially concentrated on nominal Maastricht criteria and probably 
neglected the more important criteria of real convergence. 
 The current period is characterized by the very active or, to put it 
better, activist role of the European Central Bank. ECB is flexing its muscles 
and has launched a new program of European quantitative easing in the form 
of the public sector purchase programme (ECB, 2015) as a part of the 
expanded asset purchase programme in spring this year. The era of pumping 
money into economies continues, the spill over effect into real economy is 
very uncertain. According to the latest estimates of Eurostat from September 
2015, the euro area struggled with deflation of -0.1%, well below the ECB´s 
inflation target, which is set at close to 2%. Likewise, real economic growth 
in the European Union lags behind its largest trading partners, the USA and 
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China, over an extended period. Additional money from the world’s central 
banks can alleviate tension in the short term but would provoke and give rise 
to other speculative bubbles in the medium or long term period. In 2014, for 
the first time in history, such a bank of the size and magnitude of the ECB 
determined a negative interest rate for the deposit facility, currently 
amounting to -0.2%. If this approach further expands, it could be viewed as 
an attack on conventional and traditional banking. Finally, we witness the era 
of employing unconventional and non-standard instruments as the European 
Central Bank performs its activities and operations on the brink of the 
framework of European law or in some controversial cases (e.g. Securities 
Market Programme, proposed Outright Monetary Transaction, Emergency 
liquidity assistance for Greece), probably even beyond its mandate outlined 
in the Protocol on the Statute of the European system of central banks and of 
the European Central Bank.  
 The last European financial and economic crisis also unveiled strong 
connectedness and interdependence between central banks, commercial 
banks and governments. Talk of a vicious circle was even heard in Brussels, 
where central banks were supplying liquidity to commercials bank and in 
return these banks were purchasing government bonds.  
 
Legal vacuum and other fundamental inadequacies in the process of 
European integration 
 In the late nineties, the euro area was considered an elite club by 
many leaders, representatives and authorities. A club which nobody would 
ever want to leave. The European Union obtained legal personality with the 
adoption of The Treaty of Lisbon (until then it had only European 
Community). According to that same Treaty, Article 50 allows for voluntary 
withdrawal from the EU. This eventuality comes more than a half-century 
after the establishment of the European Economic Community.  This issue is 
more complicated with “membership” in the euro area, because it is still 
legally impossible to leave the euro zone. The reason is simple, no such thing 
as a euro zone in terms of an international institution with legal personality 
exists in European law. Eurozone is only some kind of politic and economic 
entity.  
 What does this mean for euro area countries in practice? If a country 
would like to abandon the single currency without breaking the acquis 
communautaire, the only option is to withdraw from the European Union. 
Even if it would be more advantageous for a country to reintroduce domestic 
currency, no mechanism can currently provide for it. One of the 
consequences of this basic legal drawback could be discerned as the current 
cheerless status in Greece. 
European Scientific Journal December 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.2   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
143 
 Greece is a prime example of a country that has ridden the wave of 
the initial success of euro and is now paying high relative costs for the 
mistakes of its political elites, who have alternated in power since the mid-
seventies. Greece as the Cradle of Western Civilization faced the ignominy 
of being the first modern liberal EU democracy to go bankrupt after World 
War II.  It de facto happened in 2012 when private creditors were forced to 
write off more than 70% of their real bond’s value within PSI (Private Sector 
involvement). Solely in the case of Greece, the European Union violated one 
of its rules: the no-bailout clause, which is a condition dictating that 
countries do not take responsibility for each other’s debt. This clause is laid 
down in the Maastricht Treaty (1993, Art. 104 Sec 1). The Establishment of 
European Stability Mechanism (wherein Greece is currently one of the 
recipients of financial assistance, alongside Cyprus) required changing a 
primary law.   
 Representatives in the EU - alternatively it applies to some national 
politics - take the path of ad hoc solutions (e.g. the network of rescue and 
bailout funds) rather than concentrating on and addressing the causes. The 
sticking point of the decision-making process in European integration is a 
clash of national and European (central) view. The European Union has huge 
potential in mutual economic cooperation, though most likely it was a wrong 
decision to introduce single currency among heterogeneous members before 
the appointed time, as recent developments somewhat confirm. Some 
European authorities and elites are trying to push the current status of the EU 
more towards political union. The latest Five Presidents’ (European 
Commission, Euro Summit, Euro group, European Central Bank, European 
Parliament) Report from June 2015 has presented an ambitious concept to 
further deepen Economic and monetary Union by 2015.  An effort is made to 
strengthen the common fiscal system. One of the barriers hindering the 
progress of transforming into a political union is just a weakness of European 
fiscal transfers. Only around 1% of EU GDP is still redistributed throughout 
the European budget.  
 Generally, as can be seen from the history of European integration, a 
large number of measures proposed at European level can be difficult to 
implement for many various reasons. To name a few: European interest (if 
there is such a thing) can be in conflict with national interests of individual 
countries; absence of a combined European nation and patriotism for the 
European Union culminating in a shared European identity; transferring part 
of national sovereignty as a symbol of national state to supranational level 
weakens European countries. The current status of the Union is somewhat 
unusual and could be described as a community of “sovereign” states with 
some federal fundamentals. The European Union and its institutional 
representatives try to achieve a form which it hasn’t grown into yet. 
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 The adopting of the Maastricht Treaty in the early nineties has 
changed the European integration process. Important economic factors and 
assumptions took a back seat at the expense of prevailing political reasons. 
Subsequent ignoring of fundamental theoretical and other aspects (Optimum 
Currency Area, theory of convergence, etc.) had negative implications for 
some Eurozone members. In particular, the common monetary policy of 
ECB and its monopoly on setting the interest rate were unsuitable for the 
group of periphery countries. The diverse economic features, performance 
and competitiveness of the EU’s members will create further tensions 
considering the absence of appropriate fiscal transfer correcting e.g. the 
unequal development of asymmetric shocks. Greece is an example of a state, 
which became a victim of the poor governance of its domestic elites and of 
the premature introduction of the euro. The country and the currency proved 
a disservice to each other.  
 The violations and manoeuvring on the edge of rules and law from 
the side of European Union leaders and institutions send wrong signals to its 
citizens. It’s rather incredible that European law, encompassing such a great 
amount of details in our everyday life, does not remember the possible 
condition of cancelling membership of the euro area, a state giving up single 
currency and reintroducing its own currency.  
 The European Union is unfortunately very often lacking 
comprehensive and real strategies, particularly exit ones. Increasingly, it 
seems clearer that the efforts to unite Europe in the near and distant future 
from the central supranational level will be nigh on impossible and 
unsuccessful for the reasons mentioned and analysed in this paper.  
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